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ABSTRACT
With the Protestant Reform and the great navigations, the consideration 
about the other and with the different one, goes through changes, especially 
against the ones considered infidels and the natives of the New World. 
On the other hand, in the sixteenth century, the Iberian Peninsula lived 
the Golden Age, with the rebirth of Scholasticism and the flourishing 
of important juridical universities, with a marked development of Law 
Science. The Spanish Dominican Francisco de Vitoria is an exponent 
of these philosophical and juridical movements. This article aims to 
understand the contribution of Vitoria to the development of the relationship 
with the indigenous and, consequently, to the reworking of alterity. By 
means of bibliographical research and qualitative method, they searched 
in the writings of Vitoria and in his historical, philosophical, theological 
and juridical contexts. the elements of reconstruction of his concept about 
natural law and to see the possibility of recognizing the rationality of the 
indigenous and the property right over their lands. The project of human 
rights construction is present in Vitoria, in the defense of the universality 
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of reason to all human beings and in the recognition of the right of the 
indigenous not to be expropriated. Thus, Vitoria expands the ethical notion 
of alterity present at that time. 
Keywords: alterity; indigenous; human rights; natural law; Francisco de 
Vitoria. 
 
O NASCIMENTO DO DIREITO À ALTERIDADE NA CIDADE
O direito dos índios em Francisco de Vitoria
Resumo: Com a Reforma Protestante e as grandes navegações, 
a consideração com o outro e o diferente passa por alterações, 
especialmente, frente aos considerados infiéis e aos nativos do Novo 
Mundo. Por outro lado, no século XVI, a Península Ibérica vivia a Era de 
Ouro, com o renascimento da Escolástica e o florescimento de importantes 
universidades jurídicas, com acentuado desenvolvimento da Ciência 
do Direito. O dominicano espanhol Francisco de Vitoria é um expoente 
desses movimentos filosófico e jurídico. Este artigo objetiva compreender 
a contribuição de Vitoria para o desenvolvimento da relação com os 
índios e, por consequência, para a reelaboração da alteridade. Por meio 
de pesquisa bibliográfica e método qualitativo, buscaram-se nos escritos 
de Vitoria e nos contextos histórico, filosófico, teológico e jurídico, os 
elementos necessários para a reconstrução de sua concepção acerca do 
direito natural e para a verificação da possibilidade de se reconhecer, 
em relação aos índios, a racionalidade e o direito de domínio sobre suas 
terras. O projeto de construção dos direitos humanos está presente em 
Vitoria, na defesa da universalidade da razão para todos os seres humanos 
e no reconhecimento do direito dos índios a não serem expropriados. Com 
isso, Vitoria amplia a noção ética de alteridade vigente à época. 
Palavras-chave: alteridade; índios; direitos humanos; direito natural; 
Francisco de Vitoria. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In a way, the European world was, at the time of the discovery 
of America, a unity. This conception would change, mainly, from XVth, 
with the Protestant Reformation and the great navigations. With Luther, 
the Christian religion is fragmented into countless denominations, and 
therefore these spread all throughout Europe. To complete the division 
a few decades later, the discoveries of other lands, peoples, and cultures 
would make Europeans question this unity even further in Europe. 
In the midst of this historical effervescence, the question of the 
“other” becomes a fundamental question. The European, when faced with 
a seemingly radical other, will have to think not only about the different but 
about his own situation in the world and his humanness. 
The sixteenth century, when such questions would be better 
elaborated, is the occasion in which there is a rediscovery of Scholasticism 
in Portugal and Spain. It is remarkable that such countries would be 
highlighted in the era of navigation. Many European theorists have used 
the scholastic framework, the originality and the historical context to reflect 
on the consequences of events. One of the implications is a reflection on 
alterity. Therefore, such authors can be called precursors of alterity in a 
practical sense, since the moment was a condition for this. 
The city is the place par excellence of alterity, propitiating the 
use of a common space that must take into account the diversity. The text 
in question has the intention of bringing to the reflection of alterity in the 
city the Spanish Dominican Francisco de Vitoria, who can be considered 
one of the first thinkers to reflect how the difference could coexist in a 
common space. 
The main objective of the article is to understand the contribution 
of Vitoria to the development of the relationship with the Indians and, 
consequently, to the re-elaboration of alterity. This attempt is fundamental 
for understanding the birth of human rights and its most famous feature - 
universality - as well as for the understanding of alterity in the city, a place 
of coexistence revalued with Modernity. 
By means of bibliographical research and qualitative method, it 
shall be searched in Francisco de Vitoria’s œuvre and in the historical, 
philosophical, theological and legal contexts the elements that creates the 
possibility of his conception of natural rights and his verification of the 
plausibility of recognizing indigenous peoples’ rationality and entitlement 
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over the lands of the New World. 
At first, the political contextualization of the historical period - 
the XVIth century will be made. It will be necessary to characterize the 
second Scholasticism and the consequences of the discoveries from the 
great navigations. It will then be seen how the emergence of the Indian, 
“the other” par excellence, will give rise to debates about alterity. In the 
sequence, the legal context will be approached, intending to locate the 
thought of Vitoria in the scope of the Legal Sciences of the time. We 
then proceed to analyze the questions of alterity and human rights. By a 
methodological choice, three texts by Francisco de Vitoria will be analyzed 
with this bias. The main idea is to be able to demonstrate how the reflection 
on alterity depends on the contact with the totally different and how, from 
this contact, are born the human rights and their aspiration to universality. 
 
1 THE SECOND SCHOLASTICS AND THE AGE OF DISCOVERIES
 
The second Scholasticism was an intellectual movement of 
rapprochement in the sixteenth century of Scholasticism, a thought school 
that occurred between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. Its creation 
and consolidation would take place mainly in the Iberian Peninsula. The 
cultural context was essential for new reflections to emerge first in Europe 
and then in the New World (America). Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) 
became the main reference of this period, being commented by several 
authors. However, from this influence would arise an original thought 
given the situation. Regarding this period, according to De Boni: 
 
Two challenges lie behind its brightness: the awareness of the need to rethink the 
Christian faith in the face of the problems of the new times, such as Reform and 
Modern Philosophy, and the maritime discoveries that brought together questions 
never posed before. It is characteristic of this time that the work to be commented in 
the theological chairs is no longer the Book of Sentences by Peter Lombard, but rather 
Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiæ. In the early years of the sixteenth century, the 
Italian Dominican Thomas de Vio Caietano commented on the Summa Theologiæ 
and his confrere Francisco de Silvestre de Ferrara, the Sum Against the Gentiles 
(these comments were attached to the respective works of Aquinas in the critical 
edition begun in the nineteenth century). A few years later, the Spanish Francisco de 
Vitoria, also Dominican, also commented the Summa Theologiæ. Along the way, a 
plethora of theologians, philosophers, and jurists, composed mainly of Dominicans 
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and Jesuits (these newly founded) followed. (DE BONI, 2009, p. 5). 
 
Within this context, the School of Salamanca would be 
fundamental for the second Scholastic: “Ugualmente si parla di una Scuola 
di Salamanca, intendendo così quei teologi spagnoli che utilizzarono i 
materiali della tradizione tomista per comprendere i problemi sollevati 
dalla scoperta dell’America”. (SCATTOLA, 2009, p. 53). The University 
of Salamanca predates the second Scholasticism. It was established by 
Alfonso IX, between 1218 and 1220. In 1255, Alexander IV granted him 
the rights of the great European universities. In the Renaissance, Salamanca 
became quite recognized due to its humanistic studies. But it is from the 
sixteenth century on that the University would put its name for once in 
Western history:
 
In agreement with the determinations of the Council of Trent, Salamanca instituted, 
in 1560, an apologetic chair. Theologians of the breadth of Francisco de Vitoria 
(1483-1546), Bañes (1528-1604), Domingos de Soto (1484-1560), all Dominicans, 
and the Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) illustrated the Studium Salmanticence in 
philosophy or in theology. With this body of teachers, the brilliance of the Sorbonne 
dimmed. (ULLMANN, 2000, p. 295). 
 
In this university environment it was necessary to reflect on the 
new times, which consisted in dealing with the unknown, the different, the 
new, that is, the discovery of America and its consequences. The discovery 
brought with it several legal, philosophical, theological, and moral 
questions. Regarding legal problems, we can mention: “[...] el atinente a 
la forma más conveniente de tomar posesión de las tierras; el relativo al 
derecho al dominio político que España tenía sobre las tierras descubiertas; 
y, en fin, el referente a la licitud de la guerra que se hacía a los indios, 
que habían de repercutir necesariamente sobre el derecho a la conquista” 
(RUIZ, 2007, p. XXXVII-XXXVIII). 
Even before the discovery of America, in 1492, the Portuguese 
and Spanish had already drawn up plans to take possession of any lands 
eventually found. In this sense, the monarchs surrounded themselves 
with jurists and ecclesiastics, in order to concretize their plans1. After the 
discovery, on March 3, 1493, Pope Alexander VI issued the Inter Cetera 
1 On this point, mention may be made of the following papal documents: Sicut Carissimus (04/04/1418), 
Cum dum praeclarae (09/01/1433), Divino Amore (08/01/1452), in addition to the Treaty of Alcáçovas 
(04/09/1479). Cf. RUIZ, 2007, p. XXXVIII-XXXIX, footnote 5. 
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bull, the first of five documents which will be known as the Alexandrine 
bulls. Together with nine other bulls, these documents gave possession to 
the Spanish and also Catholic kings, Ferdinand and Isabella, and to the 
Portuguese crown the lands that would be discovered: 
 
Lo que debe resaltarse es que, al momento de otorgase, la doctrina y la práctica 
política consideraba que la potestad pontificia podía otorgar las tierras nuevas 
pobladas por paganos. Expedidas las bulas, se planteó inmediatamente la cuestión de 
si concedían un verdadero dominio político o sólo un poder especial para propagar 
el Evangelio; y, si se trataba de un dominio político auténtico, se suscitó el tema de 
cómo se incorporaban a la Corona de Castilla. (RUIZ, 2007, p. XLVI-XLVII). 
 
With the colonization, the discovered land was divided and the 
Indians were ordered to the settlers. The encomienda consisted of a contract 
in which the king gave the colonizer the right to raise wealth by sending a 
portion to the metropolis, but he was obliged to educate the Indians under 
his care in the Christian faith and to defend the new lands in the name of 
the Crown. 
A debate about the Indians and the lands newly found began in 
Europe. Had the native’s rights to the land they were in? Were the lands the 
Crown’s? Such questions were not very clear among European thinkers. 
From the point of view of kings and settlers, the lands discovered should 
be in the possession of Europeans, since economic interest was present. 
On the other hand, among the intellectuals, the questions posed were more 
difficult to answer. 
 
2 THE LEGAL CONTEXT OF FRANCISCO DE VITORIA
 
Although he studied Arts and Theology at the University of 
Paris, Francisco de Vitoria was also influenced by the juridical content that 
spread in Europe, with the revival of Roman law. 
 Its training environment, and especially of teaching, at maturity, 
is permeated by a normative and argumentative awareness, with an analysis 
of practical cases. 
Under the light of commentators or bartolistas2 Francis of Victoria 
2 The reviewers made an analysis of the movement Corpus Juris Civilis during the XIV to XVI 
centuries, which appeared in the revival of roman jurisprudence At that time, in recent law universities, 
the Corpus was used as a source of rationalization of legal methods, allowing the resurgence of legal 
technique and theorization and the valuation of normative abstractions. One of the most important 
members of this movement was Bártolo de Sassoferrato, Italian jurisconsult recognized for his 
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was interested in the legal analysis of civil and ecclesiastical authorities, 
examining the exercise of their powers as well as their relationship. He 
defined the preeminence of the papal’s spiritual authority over civil power, 
but not temporal authority, and was one of the pioneers working the 
principles of the rights of nations, the embryo of international law, in the 
work already quoted De Potestate Civili. 
It is symptomatic that Vitoria brightened his career as a professor 
at the University of Salamanca, a major center for Romanist studies, 
founded mainly on the mos italicus juris docendi. 
The mos italicus was the method of analysis and teaching 
adopted by the School of Commentators or post-glossers, from the 14th 
century, which gave a practical sense in the use of Corpus Juris Civilis, 
with philological, analytical and synthetic procedures, integrating local 
sources in its application. The method still held reverence for the authority 
of the Corpus, but it also used the glosses of the previous school (glosters) 
and regional customs, feudal principles, and ecclesiastical law. The 
method of “argumentation, debate, and polemic typical of scholasticism” 
was adopted (CAENEGEM, 2000, p. 74), which would allow the law to 
assume a scientific position. 
From the analysis of the Roman text, it was extracted the general 
principles to guide the solution of concrete cases. However, the authority 
of the text was preserved, and those principles were indisputable. 
The aim was to reach the sensus of the text, that is to say, its 
intent was no longer satisfied to clarify the letter (littera) of the Corpus, as 
the glosses did, but to attain its spirit, its practical content. 
Together with other moral theologians and Spanish jurists, 
Vitoria promoted a European jusrationalism, at a time tied to the rebirth of 
Roman jurisprudence. 
This revival of jurisprudence found in the newly constituted 
lay universities the conducive environment for refusing feudal traditions 
and allying with bourgeois interests. The main juridical changes were due 
mainly to the unity of the object of the juridical sciences, which dealt with 
the Corpus Juris Civilis and the unity of methods employed by jurists, 
among them scholastic dialectics. 
Under the lights that would form the modern School of Natural 
Law, Francisco de Vitoria is one of the forerunners of the new science of 
comments. Because of his fame, the lawyers of this school were also known as bartolistas. This 
recognition gave rise to a Latin adage very famous in the universities of Modern Age Law: Nemo 
bonus jurist nisi bartolista, that is, “no one is a good jurist if not a bartolista”. 
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natural law, in the midst of the Thomistic tradition, but with an axiological 
objectivism, whereby values  and principles assume objective and universal 
validity, independently of the experience of individuals. 
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), great exponent of the School of 
Natural Law and considered by many as the father of International Law, 
in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), refers to Francisco de Vitoria as one 
of his influences both in the elaboration of the principles derived from 
the common legal experience offered by the Spanish moral-theological 
tradition, especially on the law of colonial and religious wars, and on the 
restriction of the position of Pope Innocent IV (GROTIUS, 2005). 
Pope Innocent IV sustained the correctness of the war against 
those who opposed nature and Francisco de Vitoria, on the other hand, 
admitted it only when it offended the State or when someone under the 
jurisdiction of the State was harmed. He demanded, therefore, the injury 
and not the simple fact of being unfaithful. (GROTIUS, 2005, Book II, 
Chapter XX). 
Vitoria represents the link between medieval canonical-
argumentative tradition and legal rationalism. 
 
3 FRANCISCO DE VITORIA AND THE INDIGENOUS QUESTION
 
In 1510, the Scottish theologian John Mair (1467-1550) discussed 
in his work Commentary on Book II of Sentences the legitimacy of the 
conquest of the discovered lands. His argument was in favor of possession. 
He used a theory used in the European context, which consisted in the 
legal justification of wars against infidels (Tartars and Muslims) who 
invaded unjustly Christian lands, in addition to the argument that infidels 
were hostile to Christians. The thesis used paralleled the European infidels 
and the American “infidels”, thus justifying the war against them. But 
what if the indigenous people are peaceful? Still, the theologian uses two 
arguments to defend the ownership of the new lands:
 
el primero es el de la vía misional, basada en la teoría atenuada de Inocencio IV sobre 
el poder universal indirecto del Papa sobre los paganos para compelirlos a abrazar la 
fe y obligar a bautizar a sus niños. Esta prevalencia del Derecho divino de la fe presto 
se convierte en poder directo de ocupación preventiva, protección por las armas de 
la predicación y facultad de imponer tributos; por fin, a los príncipes infieles que 
resisten a la fe puede la Iglesia privarles de su jurisdicción y deponerles en beneficio 
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de los príncipes cristianos. En el segundo argumento, Mayor admite el estado de 
barbarie de los indios que les hace esclavos por naturaleza según la teoría aristotélica. 
Por ello es lícito al príncipe cristiano sojuzgarles, ocupar sus tierras y someterles a 
efectiva servidumbre. (URDANOZ, 1974, p. 118). 
 
One can see that the first argument is based on the submission 
of civil power to ecclesiastical power. The second, based on Aristotle, 
assumes that the Indians would be barbarians, therefore, they are slaves by 
nature. Such theses were used insistently by the defenders of the indigenous 
submission and the taking of the American lands. For Aristotle (1998), as 
stated in Politics, there were two types of slaves: slaves by nature, who 
did not have the intellectual capacity to command themselves and possess 
properties, which Mair interprets to be the case of the indigenous peoples; 
and the slaves by convention, who would be the men caught in the war. 
In turn, in 1511, a voice dissonant to that of the Scottish theologian 
was raised. It was the Dominican Antonio de Montesinos (1475-1545) 
who, in a sermon from the time of Advent, appealed to the Spaniards with 
the following words:
 
By what right have you waged an atrocious war against these people who lived 
peacefully in their own country? Why do you leave them in such a state of 
extenuation? Why do you kill them to demand that they bring their gold daily? Are 
not they men? Do they not have reason and soul? Is it not your duty to love them as 
yourself? (ANTÔNIO DE MONTESINOS apud SALES, 2012, p. 52). 
 
Contrary to Mair, who took the Indians as unreasonable beings, 
the argument used by Montesinos is that they are men, because they have 
rationality and soul, and therefore could not be dominated. 
From these different positions, Europe will enter into a dispute 
to justify the destruction and possession of the new regions or the care 
and fraternity with the inhabitants of America. It is interesting to note 
that, through different actors, the same Europe that will destroy American 
culture will also be the one that will defend the rights of indigenous peoples. 
Inserted in this debate is the name of Francisco de Vitoria 
(1483-1546). Vitoria was born in Burgos, Spain, in 1483. He entered the 
Dominican Convent of St. Paul in his city. Possibly, in 1508, he was sent to 
the Convent of Santiago in Paris by his superiors to study Humanities, Arts 
and later Theology, having a class with the aforementioned John Mair in 
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1522, he acquired the title of Doctor of Theology. In 1523, he went to the 
city of Valladolid, working at the College of St. Gregory, where he had the 
opportunity to explain in class the Theological Sum of Thomas Aquinas, 
great inspirer of the second Scholastica. 
In 1526, after the death of Pedro de Leon, the Dominicans invited 
Victoria to take over the First Chair, which he kept until 1546, the year of 
his death: 
 
En Salamanca consiguió gran prestigio por la profundidad y nítida exposición de las 
cuestiones de la Suma en sus relecciones o exposiciones solemnes y públicas. Así se 
convirtió en el maestro por excelencia de las relecciones. De entre ellas sobresalen 
las que se refieren al derecho, tanto civil interno y eclesiástico como internacional. 
(FRAYLE DELGADO, 2007, p. XI). 
Francisco de Vitoria enters into the thematic of the consequences 
of the discovery with the concern to understand if the Indians were 
submitted to the Spanish power. At bottom, the question was whether the 
peoples of America had property (dominium) over their property and the 
lands on which they lived. Thus, one could decide on the legitimacy or not 
of the Spanish conquests. 
It is important to turn to the works of Vitoria, seeking to summarize 
their arguments, which will include the theological, philosophical and legal 
aspects. 
In De Potestate Civili (1528), Vitoria asks about secular power. 
For him, the city is not an artificial human creation, but:
 
[…] algo que brota de la naturaleza que sugirió este modo de vida de los mortales 
para su defesa y conservación [...] ninguna sociedad puede tener consistencia sin 
una fuerza o poder que la gobierne y la proteja. En efecto, la utilidad y finalidad del 
poder público y de la sociedad o comunidad son una misma cosa”. (FRANCISCO 
DE VITORIA, 2007, p. 13). 
 
The city is a natural creation that needs the power to preserve 
itself; however, such ability and power emanate from God. 
Francis will wonder if those who govern the republics of the 
infidels (pagans) have legitimate princes and magistrates. Drawing on Paul 
and Peter as authorities, the Spanish thinker states that:
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Además no hay que poner en duda que entre los paganos haya príncipes y señores 
legítimos, puesto que el Apóstol en los textos antes citados manda obedecer a los 
poderes y a los príncipes y servirles en todo tempo; y éstos ciertamente entonces 
eran todos infieles. José y Daniel eran administradores y ministros de los príncipes 
paganos. Y los príncipes cristianos seculares o eclesiásticos no podrían privar a los 
infieles de tal potestad y principado sólo por el hecho de ser infieles, a no ser que 
hubieran recibido de ellos otra cualquier injuria. (FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2007, 
p. 22) (I, 9)3
For Francisco de Vitoria, even the governments of the indigenous 
peoples were legitimate, since the apostles commanded to obey any 
existing government because they were submitted to the power of God. 
On the other hand, he asserts that Christian or ecclesiastical princes do not 
have the right to deny the power of unfaithful people, even if they do not 
cope with the same faith. 
If in the work De Potestate Civili Vitoria focuses on civil power 
in general, in the works DeIndis Recenter Inventis, relectio prior (On the 
newly discovered Indians, relectio primeira (1538-1539)) and De Indis, 
sive de jure belli hispaniorum in barbarians, relectio posterior (On the 
Indians or On the law of the war of the Spaniards on the barbarians, 
relectio second (1539)), the thinker will stop on the issues that involve 
the discovery and the Indians. These three works are from his period in 
Salamanca. They are part of the writings called relectiones. There was an 
obligation at the universities for the teacher to give a public lesson about 
his studies once a year; such texts were known as relectiones: “Dichas 
relecciones eran exposiciones solemnes que los catedráticos hacían cada 
año para toda la comunidad universitaria y, según la tradición y costumbre, 
tenían lugar en días festivos para facilitar la asistencia de todos” (FRAYLE 
DELGADO, 2007, p. XII). 
In the first relectio on the Indians, Vitoria affirms that this writing 
is due “por causa de esos bárbaros del Nuevo Mundo, llamados vulgarmente 
indios que desconocidos antes en nuestro mundo han venido hace cuarenta 
3 The writings of Paul used as authority are in Epistle to the Romans: Rom 13: 1-2: “Submit yourselves 
to the established authorities, for there is no authority that is not of God, and those that are were 
instituted by God. Anyone who opposes authority is opposed to the order established by God. Those 
who oppose, draw upon themselves condemnation. “ Epistle to Titus: Titus 3, 1: “Remind them that 
they should be submissive to the magistrates and authorities, who must obey and be ready for every 
good work. “ First Letter to Timothy: 1 Tim 2: 1-2: “First and foremost, I urge you to make requests, 
prayers, supplications, and thanksgiving on behalf of all men, by kings, and by all who have authority, 
that we lead a calm and serene life, with all piety and dignity. “ Peter’s text is in 1 Peter 2: 13-14: 
“Submit yourselves to every human creature for the sake of the Lord, whether to the king as ruler, 14 
or to the governors as his messengers to punish the evildoers, and to praise those who do good. “ Cf. 
BÍBLIA SAGRADA: Edição Pastoral. Disponível em: <http://www. paulus. com. br/biblia-pastoral/_
INDEX. HTM>. Acesso em: 30 abr. 2017. (our translation)
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años a poder de los españoles” (FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2007, p. 59). 
The central theme is the American Indian. 
Initially, Vitoria was interested in knowing if the Indians, before 
the arrival of the Spaniards, were the owners of their possessions and if 
there were true princes among them. The argument of those who defended 
the position that the Indians did not have and could not have possessions 
was based on a) being sinful and unfaithful; and b) being idiotic and 
demented (ie, lacking in reason). In relation to the first argument, 
contrarily, Francisco de Vitoria (2007: 70) states that “El pecado mortal 
no impide el dominio civil ni el verdadero dominio” In order to defend 
this claim, Vitoria uses seven arguments: 1 - the sinner does not lose the 
natural domain (God’s gift) and the civil domain (gift of God and human 
right), because, it remains with the mastery of its own acts and members, 
which proves the right to defend one’s life; 2 - the Holy Scriptures call 
evil men and sinners of kings (Solomon, Ahab and others), who, therefore, 
are also masters; 3 - the domain is based on rationality (image of God), 
and sin does not remove rationality; 4 - King David was also a sinner; 5 - 
Genesis (49, 40) speaks of the possibility of a kingdom being ruled by an 
evil king; 6 - just as mortal sin does not withdraw spiritual power (eg a bad 
bishop has the power to ordain priests), sin does not withdraw civil power 
either; 7- The Scriptures (Romans 13, 5 and 1Pe 2:18) speak in obedience 
to the princes (even evil) and the precept of not taking the thing of others. 
(FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2007, p. 71-72). 
Then Vitoria would dwell on this question: if infidelity is a 
reason for losing the domain. For him, “La infidelidad no es impedimento 
para ser verdadero dueño”. (FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2007, p. 73). 
His reflection is based on the Summa Theologiae (IIaIIae, q. 90, a10 and 
a12) of St. Thomas Aquinas and in some passages of the Scriptures (Rom 
13: 5, 1Pe 2, 18, To 2, 13 and Gn 47, 20-21), which illustrate unfaithful 
kings in power and the need to obey such monarchs. In short, infidelity is 
not capable of destroying the domain either in natural law or in positive 
law, including in the latter the possession of material goods. Obviously, 
thinking of the Indians, Francisco de Vitoria (2007, 74) states that “De lo 
cual se deduce claramente que no es lícito despojar a los sarracenos, a los 
judíos y a cualesquiera de los infieles de los bienes que poseen, sólo por el 
hecho de ser infieles. El hacerlo es hurto o rapiña como si se hiciera a los 
cristianos. “
Francisco de Vitoria (2007 p. 78) concluded on the question 
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analyzed, “Que ni el pecado por infidelidad ni otros pecados mortales 
son obstáculo para que los bárbaros sean verdaderos dueños tanto pública 
como privadamente, y que por este título los cristianos no puedan ocupar 
sus bienes e sus tierras”. Thus, the infidel barbarians, in the Dominican’s 
view, are allowed to own property, which means that even Christians can 
not withdraw and invade the properties of the Indians. 
Victory, then, dwells on the second point: if those who are not 
right (idiots) can not have property, or, in other words, “if one is capable of 
dominion, the use of reason is rich. “ (FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2007, 
p. 78). In this context, it will be discussed whether or not the Indians have 
reason. 
First, Vitoria analyzes the notion of Conrad Summerhart (1455-
1502) that, in order to have dominion, the reason is not necessary. For this 
theologian, the domain extends to irrational creatures, since, in his view, 
mastery is the right to use something to his advantage. For example, brutes 
are entitled to herbs and plants (Gen 1, 29-30) and the stars have the right 
to light (Gen 1, 17-18). However, Vitoria does not share this view, since, 
for him, irrational creatures do not have dominion because they have no 
right, as Conrado himself says. They have no right, for they can not suffer 
injury. (FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2007, p. 78-79). 
On the basis of Thomas Aquinas, Vitoria affirms that only the 
rational creature has control over his acts, that is, the capacity to decide on 
this or that, since, on the one hand, “si los brutos no tiene dominio sobre 
sus actos, tampoco sobre las demás cosas” (FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 
2007, p. 80). On the other hand, animals also do not move, but they are 
moved, not having control (FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2007, p. 80). The 
fundamental point in these arguments is the fact that for something to have 
mastery it must be the master of one’s own acts. 
Next, Victoria wonders if a child, before the total use of reason, 
has dominion. The answer is “[e]sto é evidente porque pueden sufrir 
injurias, luego también tienen derecho sobre las cosas; luego también 
dominio, que no es sino derecho”. (FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2007, p. 
81). The question allows the author to affirm the theological thesis that the 
foundation of dominion is the image of God, equally present in children. 
In the case of the insane, those who do not use reason and 
won’t ever do, they can also have possession, as they can suffer injuries, 
which means having rights.4 (FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2007, p. 82). 
4 Roberto Pich draws attention to the possible interpretations on this point: “The interpretative difficulty 
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Barbarians (Indians) are also not demented, since:
 
Se prueba porque en realidad no son dementes sino que a su manera tienen uso 
de razón. Está claro, porque tienen cierto orden en sus cosas, una vez que poseen 
ciudades establecidas ordenadamente, y tienen matrimonios claramente constituidos, 
magistrados, señores, leyes, artesanos, mercaderes, cosas todas ellas que requieren 
el uso de razón; asimismo tienen una especie de religión, no yerran en cosas que 
son evidentes para los demás, lo cual es indicio de uso de razón. (FRANCISCO DE 
VITORIA, 2007, p. 82). 
 
The above quotation is spectacular, in the sense of illustrating a 
sixteenth-century author describing the indigenous way of life so well, as 
well as opening the thesis that they are as men as the Europeans, for they 
have reason (although they can improve it, in Vitoria’s view), and therefore 
have the capacity for dominance, which means that the American lands 
were theirs and that the Spaniards (and Portuguese) did not respect this 
condition. Moreover, the author believes that the indigenous people have a 
religion, being able to act correctly through reason like all humanity. The 
conclusion is that there is only one human nature. Perhaps here is the birth 
of modern human rights. 
For Vitoria, there is no doubt that the Indians were masters before 
the arrival of the Spaniards, therefore, owners of what they had. Like this,
 
los bárbaros eran pública y privadamente tan dueños como los cristianos, y que 
tampoco por este título ni sus príncipes ni los particulares pudieron ser despojados de 
sus posesiones como no fueran verdaderos dueños. Y sería inicuo negarles a éstos, que 
is as follows, and is related to Vitoria’s propositions on the souls: he believes that a minimal measure 
of participation in reason - which makes it possible only to obey a master by nature-is it sufficient for 
the mastery of something, or indeed does it not accept that the permanent deficiency of reason was 
a convincing thesis on any human being, since it would seem to injure some other philosophical or 
theological conviction ? It is almost unnecessary to say that in these cases Vitoria basically believes that 
the Indians are “barbarians” in the specific sense that they have little developed their rational powers or 
do not have a stage of culture and civilization equal to that of the Spaniards. It is not possible here to 
relativize or repudiate this judgment, but it should be said that, in Vitoria, it would be only a judgment 
of cultural appreciation, not anthropological. Nothing in Vitoria’s texts suggests that he would accept 
the first hypothesis - which, in fact, is eventually unsustainable -; and although he does not literally 
affirm the second hypothesis, it seems to him that he takes it as most likely to be true (remembering 
that relectio has as its goal to argue in favor of more probable sentences according to reason). The last 
sentence on the attribution of disability on the grounds of the barbarians and the consequent contesting 
of their dominion is this: “And whatever it may be about [that is, the opinion of the jurisconsults on the 
civil domain], here is the fourth proposition: neither of this part [= of the part of the full civil domain] 
the barbarians are prevented from being true owners “. As already said, this last sentence under this 
theme adds something to the previous one: even if the attribute of “deficiency in reason” is attested to 
the barbarians, it is concluded that they have mastery, both natural and civil. In what follows, I suggest 
that the second hypothesis described above is at hand “(PICH, 2012, pp. 389-390). 
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nunca nos hicieron ninguna injuria. (FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2007, p. 82-83). 
From the main argument analyzed above, Vitoria will consider 
other issues related to the conquest. In his text, there is a critique of the 
power of civil rulers, as well as a critique of papal power. At the beginning 
of the second part of De Indis Prior, the Spanish thinker wonders whether 
he had the right to dominate the whole land. Clearly, the bottom line is 
whether the Spanish rulers, as kings, were entitled to the new lands. For 
Francisco de Vitoria (2007, p. 91), the answer will be negative, because, 
“el dominio no puede ser sino de derecho natural, bien sea divino, bien 
humano. Ahora bien, por ninguno de esos derechos hay un solo señor de 
todo el orbe”. 
Another argument used by those who defended the possession of 
the new lands by the European monarchs was based on the fact that some 
understood the pope as being the monarch of the whole world, and he, in 
turn, recognized the emperor’s right over the lands discovered. Francisco 
de Vitoria (2007, p. 99), based on the authority of Christ, affirms, “Y si 
Cristo no tuvo el dominio temporal, como antes hemos defendido como 
lo más probable, y también de acuerdo con la sentencia de Santo Tomás, 
mucho menos lo tendrá el Papa, que es su vicario”. Moreover, “The Pope, 
however, has no such power over the infidels, nor could he excommunicate 
them, nor prohibit the marriages permitted by divine right. “ (FRANCISCO 
DE VITORIA, 2007, p. 100). 
Even if the barbarians do not want to accept Christ, they can 
not wage war on them or cause any damage, for if this were so, such an 
attitude would be commonplace in Christian lands, since there are infidels 
who remain with their possessions: “De lo dicho se desprende claramente 
que los españoles, cuando por primera vez llevaban navegando a las tierras 
de los bárbaros, no llevaban consigo ningún derecho para ocupar sus 
territórios”. (FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2007, p. 105). 
At the beginning of the third part of De Indis Prior, Vitoria 
defends the thesis that the Spaniards could stay in the new territories, 
provided they did no harm to the natives, and they could not prohibit the 
Spaniards from staying there. Hastily, one might argue that such a view 
is the colonizer’s; however, Vitoria’s position, once again, is surprising. 
The justification would be based on a common law existing for all peoples 
of the Earth!Vitoria elaborates fourteen reasons for maintaining relations 
between peoples. The first, because it is of great lucidity, deserves to be 
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transcribed:
 
Se prueba, primero, por el derecho de gentes, que es derecho natural o se deriva 
del derecho natural, según el texto de las Instituciones ‘Lo que la razón natural ha 
establecido entre todas las gentes se llama derecho de gentes’. En efecto, en todas 
las naciones se tiene por inhumano el tratar mal, sin motivo alguno especial, a los 
huéspedes y transeúntes y, por el contrario, es de humanidad y cortesía portarse bien 
con los transeúntes que viajan a otras naciones. (FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2007, 
p. 130). 
 
What is behind these words is the realization that, because of a 
common law, men should treat each other well, which shows humanity. 
The intercommunication between men is also a reason that justifies a 
respectful relationship among peoples, since there is a communion among 
the nations, thus allowing men to pass through all regions of the planet. In 
short, there is a right to come and go among peoples:
 
Second. Al principio del mundo, siendo todas las cosas comunes, a cualquiera le 
estaba permitido dirigirse y recorrer las regiones que quisiera. Y eso no parece que 
haya sido abolido por la división de bienes, pues nunca fue intención de las gentes 
suprimir la intercomunicación de los hombres por ese reparto, y en Verdad en tiempos 
de Noé eso hubiese sido inhumano. (FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2007, p. 130). 
 
According to a common law, Spaniards and barbarians can 
trade among themselves, as long as they do not harm the citizens of both 
communities. Thus, the trade is authorized, if there is an excess of the 
products commercialized. (FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2007, p. 132). 
On the second relectio on the Indians - De Indis, sive de jure 
belli hispaniorum in barbaros, relectio posterior -, Victoria retakes the first 
relectio, but worries to justify the war and occupation of the discovered 
land. 
Disseminating what would be a just war, Victoria makes 
important statements about relations between peoples. The thinker works 
with three insufficient reasons to wage a just war: a) religious diversity; 
b) the pretension of extending the domains; and c) the glory of the prince 
or another particular benefit. (FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2007, p. 173-
174). 
It may be noted that such motives were alleged by the conquerors 
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in order to decimate the American peoples. Therefore, the very idea of 
exploring colony is a misunderstanding, since it presupposes items (b) and 
(c). 
It is possible to identify in Victoria some elements common 
to contemporary human rights. Such rights would be inherent to human 
nature. In speaking of the American Indians, Victoria, in fact, speaks of 
man in general. It is possible to perceive the inalienability, inviolability, 
equality, and universality of a right common to all men in Vitoria’s work. 
Therefore, this right is never lost, as it must always be respected, it is 
identical and common for all:
 
La inalienabilidad porque para Vitoria, son derechos unidos al mismo ser racional 
del hombre, por lo que no se pierden en ninguna ocasión, ni aun en el caso en que 
no se puedan ejercitar por las limitaciones que pudiera imponer el derecho positivo. 
La inviolabilidad porque a lo largo de sus reelecciones invoca el respecto sobre estos 
derechos; respecto que afirma en defensa de los indios y se basa en la dignidad e 
integridad de la persona, el honor debido al hombre, el respeto a sus posesiones y 
formas de administración política. 
La igualdad viene a ser también una cualidad necesaria de los derechos humanos, 
derivada de la misma formulación, al establecer como campo de derechos el universo 
de todo el género humano, es decir, propugna que todos los seres humanos deben 
disfrutarlos por igual. 
Y la universalidad porque los derechos humanos se enuncian y reconocen para todo 
ser racional. El carácter humano es lo que determina la base de todos estos derechos, 
porque son propios a su misma naturaleza. (MORA HERNÁNDEZ, 2013, p. 44). 
 
There was no ideal in Vitoria to characterize fundamental human 
rights; however, the analysis of the concrete case of “discovery” was 
crucial to reach such characteristics. 
 
4 ON ALTERITY: ETHICS BEFORE THE OTHER
 
 Alterity has played such a fundamental role in modern Ethics 
that it is possible to verify its presence and development in thinkers with 
very different premises, such as Francisco de Vitoria and Jean-Paul Sartre, 
but also in this theme, they also show complementarity of reflections. 
 Vitoria’s theological positioning and Sartre’s atheistic 
existentialism hold the common thread of human defense and recognition 
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of the other. Sartre made a chorus with him in the struggle against political 
determinism: Vitoria was in the context of colonization in the New World, 
under the argument of “humanizing” the infidels; Sartre, in the private 
freedom of the self. 
The Sartrean freedom was in the aptitude of the human being 
to be the creator of sense, to interrogate. Freedom is not a quality or 
characteristic of the human, but it is human itself. Therefore, he states:
 
Indeed, if we were to admit that interrogation is determined by a universal 
determinism, it would cease to be not only intelligible but conceivable. [...] by a 
double movement of displacement, the interrogator will not change the subject in 
question, placing him in a neutral state, between being and non-being, and himself 
refutes himself to the subject, to be able to extract from him the possibility of a non-
being. [...] Questioning is, therefore, by definition, a human process. Therefore, man 
presents himself, at least in this case, as a being that makes the Nothingness appear 
in the world, insofar as, to that end, it affects itself not to be. (SARTRE, 2007, p. 66). 
 
The interesting thing is that this “process of being constituted” 
of the subject is not done alone, although individually. In Vitoria’s work, a 
discourse of affirmation of the Indian is identified, contingent and necessary 
for the European to perceive and perceive the other. Most importantly, 
do not discount your conduct to irrelevance or irresponsibility. Sartre 
recognizes the human being as the only definer of the world and of himself, 
but also as the holder of absolute responsibility for what he consciously 
recognizes. As José Luis Pérez points out:
 
In Sartre, the responsibility deriving from individual freedom denotes, therefore, the 
continuous need for each human individual to respond to the peers who observe him 
during each action, in the expectation of a definition of what this human reality is 
that is always to be said. [...] Responsibility is, therefore, the exact point at which the 
odyssey of individual freedom, which is the very existence and singular existence 
of a single human, is recognized as a truly communal adventure. (PÉREZ, 2012, p. 
311). 
 
Thus, the freedom that exists individually contextualizes itself 
intersubjectively in the other. One can perceive that freedom presupposes 
an individual moment - of understanding, deliberation and action - and 
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a relational moment, in the evaluation of oneself and the world, from its 
previous experiences, its values  and its models of understanding. 
Beyond the individual’s power of action, freedom is projected 
into the conceptual ordering of the world - by which, in the interrogation, 
it “becomes one,” as Sartre would say. 
For this reason, freedom causes codependency to generate 
responsibility. In the words of Sartre himself:
 
When I declare that freedom, through each concrete circumstance, can only aim at 
self-love, then, if man recognizes that in his helplessness he is establishing values, he 
can no longer want but one thing: Freedom as the foundation of all values. This does 
not mean that he wants it abstractly. This simply means that the acts of men in good 
faith have as their ultimate meaning the pursuit of freedom as such. A man who joins 
such a union, communist or revolutionary, wants concrete goals. These goals imply 
an abstract will for freedom, but this freedom is concretely wanted. We want freedom 
for freedom and through each particular circumstance. And, wanting freedom, we 
find that it depends entirely on the freedom of others and that the freedom of others 
depends on our own. Of course, freedom as a definition of man does not depend on 
another, but once there is commitment, I am obliged to want my freedom at the same 
time as the freedom of others; I can only take my freedom as a target if, likewise, I 
take the liberty of others as a target. (SARTRE, 2009, p. 636). 
 
There is, therefore, a hidden and fundamental element in 
the defenses of Victoria and Sartre, the alter, which, even in individual 
freedom, imposes the recognition of the other. This element imposes the 
assumption of an ethical position of respect for the other; therefore, it is 
not based on the dominating rationalism, which reduces the other to an 
object, but in the identification of the other as free subject to constitute its 
own dignity. 
The Science of Law sometimes recognizes alterity only from the 
formal point of view, that is, as the necessary relationship with another 
individual, expressed in the formula: Ubi jus ibi societas. However, 
alterity in the law must be based on the recognition of individualities, on 
the differences of the concrete individual, be it Christian or “barbarian”, 
European or American. In this sense, the warning of Roberto de Aguiar 
also occurs, when affirming that there is a:
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[...] dogmatic fixation of the metaphysical root of the common legal sense [that] 
does not deal with the juridical from the relation between the different, but from a 
unifying norm that dilutes the subjects within an abstract equality and removes from 
those involved in the legal relationship their faces, their existences and concreteness. 
(AGUIAR, 2006, p. 12)
 
Thus, alterity surpasses the recognition of the other as subject, 
in order to attain it as a single, free and responsible being, to be respected 
in its difference and autonomy. This is Vitoria’s defense of the Indians: he 
recognizes them as rational beings and, therefore, masters of their actions; 
and as holders of rights over land, as capable of domination. 
 
5 FROM ALTERITY TO HUMAN RIGHTS
 
From the recognition of the alterity of the Indians, Francisco de 
Vitoria brings about mutual solidarity and mutual responsibility in relations 
between peoples. 
Vitoria gives rise to the universalization of rights and, on a 
jusnaturalist basis, later allows the characteristics attributed to rights to 
evolve towards the consideration of human rights. These, although not yet 
named and conceptualized by the Spanish author, are already understood 
as commands that are independent of the action of States and that are 
justified as moral duties to be universalized. They reflect, therefore, the 
acceptance - now so often, but in the time of Victoria still restricted to 
scholarly circles - that all human beings must have rights, for there is only 
one human nature, characterized by rationality. 
There are contemporary authors who criticize the universality of 
human rights based on axiological and cultural relativism, that is, there 
would be no universal human rights since the pluralism of values  and 
cultures requires a particularism in the recognition of rights. On these 
objections, Pérez Luño (1998) says that many violations are perpetrated 
under this argument, as is the case of female illiteracy and female genital 
mutilation. And it also rejects that this relativism cannot represent a “right 
to indifference”, legitimating impunity. It maintains, therefore, that there 
are rational characteristics in the tradition of human rights, which can not be 
disregarded. There is a need to share an ethical attitude in the construction 
of modernity. 
The idea of  rights for all humans corresponds to the more 
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contemporary characterization of human rights. Perez Luño (1999: 48), 
for example, places them as a set of faculties that “fulfill the requirements 
for human dignity, freedom, and equality,” something similar to the 
characterization of the rights of the indigenous towards Europeans, by 
Vitoria. 
Francisco de Vitoria (2007) creates a global space of non-
violence, a common law existing for all peoples, which requires harmonious 
behavior for a communion among nations. In short, there is a right to come 
and go among peoples and the justification of war against the barbarians is 
not acceptable simply because they are unfaithful or sinful. For the same 
reason, the occupation of their lands or the taking of their property is not 
authorized; though barbaric, they have the right to dominion. 
The foundation for the defense of the natural right to equality 
was made by the rational essence of all men and the right to freedom lies 
in the very creation of man, who was not created to be a slave nor to be 
coerced. It is not justified, therefore, the coercion that seeks to imbue faith 
in the human being. 
In the same vein, the theologian accepts the correctness of some 
wars, but these cannot be based only on religious diversity or on the 
pretension of extending the domains of the prince, the state or even the 
papacy. There is no temporal authority over the whole world, neither the 
pope nor the Spanish kings. (FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2007)
War is justifiable as long as it is a path used after the attempts 
at peace have been exhausted; let it be done without hatred, seeking only 
justice; and that the consequences of triumph should not be disregarded 
and justified in the very cause of war. (FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, 2007)
Man is also recognized as a social being, endowed with the right 
to citizenship, and political power must be exercised in the name of the 
people. For this reason, Vitoria (2007) also recognizes the right to disobey 
the rulers who exercise political power in their own interests, and not the 
people’s. 
Finally, the embryo of free trade is in the ideas of Francisco de 
Vitoria (2007), who advocates permission to trade, even with barbarian 
peoples, if there is a surplus of production. 
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CONCLUSION
 
When Francis of Victory needs to reflect on the other, he is not 
so much concerned with differences as with what makes all men human 
beings. When confronted with other societies and cultures and with the 
indigenous populations, his argument starts from the assumption that the 
“other” is also human. 
Like the Europeans, the Indians had the right to have and conserve 
their society and state. Vitoria offers arguments that criticize the notion of 
the colonizer. What the Spaniards were doing was, from the philosophical, 
theological, and legal point of view of Vitoria, a misconception. Even 
without believing in the same deity, the Indians had the same rights of 
dominion as the Spaniards. 
When questioned about the rationality of the Indians, Francisco 
has the opportunity to say that not only are they right, but that is the same 
for everyone. It is this reason that will enable the Indians to have society, 
rituals, cities, and politics. In this sense, if there were no consensus among 
the different peoples, the unilateral relationship would be regarded as prey. 
Francis suggests the other as the same, since, in the strict sense, 
there are common characteristics, which can be the starting point for good 
coexistence, respect, friendship, and empathy. When one does not see 
oneself in the other, coexistence is impossible. The lesson of Francis of 
Victory remains current but often neglected by selfish interests. 
Vitoria is a great representative of the Golden Age in Spain and 
launches important bases for the human rights construction project. His 
work in the construction of international law is cited by Hugo Grotius 
himself, considered the “father” of this branch of law, for recognizing his 
contribution to the discussion of justice for colonial and religious wars and 
for delimiting the jurisdiction of the State and Church. 
Finally, it should be stressed that if the West is always accused in 
a reductionist way of not respecting difference, it must be said that, despite 
the various atrocities committed against the other, reflection on alterity is 
a concern of Western culture through its theoretical framework. For this 
reason, to retake an author of the sixteenth century is part of the search for 
the reflection of alterity in the city. 
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